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ZONES OF DISCRETION AT COMMON LAW 
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ABSTRACT—Long controversial, the doctrine of qualified immunity 
provides a civil liability shield for police officers and other executive branch 
officials. Scholars have questioned the doctrine, in part on the basis that it 
lacks support in the common law rules of official liability that were in place 
in the nineteenth century when Section 1983 became law. In a recently 
published article, Scott Keller defends the doctrine’s legality by arguing that 
the common law did indeed recognize forms of qualified immunity. 
This Essay suggests that the authorities on which Keller relies comprise 
a body of administrative law, defining zones of official discretion, rather than 
a body of qualified immunity law. Many of the doctrines Keller identifies 
operate much the way Chief Justice Marshall’s account of judicial review 
operated in Marbury v. Madison. Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that 
matters lawfully assigned to the discretion of the executive branch were 
beyond the scope of judicial review. But where an official’s lawful discretion 
ended and legal boundaries were transgressed, the common law was 
available (indeed obliged, according to Chief Justice Marshall) to supply a 
remedy. In much of what Keller points to, common law courts were deferring 
to executive action taken within the zones of their lawful discretion. But the 
common law did not confer a qualified immunity when executive officials 
transgressed those boundaries and violated protected rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A controversial judge-made doctrine, qualified immunity bars the 
award of damages to victims of constitutional wrongs unless the defendant 
government officials violated “clearly established law.”1 The doctrine has 
come under renewed scrutiny since the killing of George Floyd.2 Scholars 
have long questioned the policy justifications for the doctrine, arguing that 
qualified immunity prevents deserving victims from securing redress and 
also, in practice, fails to protect officers through the promised pretrial 
dismissal of dubious claims.3 Others have expressed doubts as to the legal 
foundations of the doctrine, pointing out that the common law of official 
liability in the nineteenth century did not incorporate rules of qualified 
immunity.4 Such findings cast doubt on the Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
Congress impliedly incorporated qualified immunity doctrines from the 
common law by adopting the precursor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 1871 as a 
statutory framework for constitutional enforcement against state actors.5 
Scott Keller, a founding partner of the law firm Lehotsky Keller LLP 
and the former solicitor general of Texas, argues in an important new article 
that scholars debating the legitimacy of modern immunity doctrines have 
 
 1  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (specifying that officers are to be liable for 
constitutional torts only where they violate clearly established law). Harlow justified the standard as one 
needed to facilitate the summary adjudication of frivolous claims and to protect officers from the burden 
of unjustifiable trials. Id. at 815–18. Although Harlow articulated the standard in the course of litigation 
brought against federal actors under the Bivens doctrine, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971), the Court explained that the same standard would 
govern suits brought against state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30. 
 2 See Nathaniel Sobel, What Is Qualified Immunity, and What Does It Have to Do with Police 
Reform?, LAWFARE (June 6, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-qualified-immunity-
and-what-does-it-have-do-police-reform [https://perma.cc/YAW5-6HSJ]. 
 3 See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 48 (2017) (finding that 
cases are rarely dismissed before discovery or trial on qualified immunity grounds, the very elements of 
litigation from which qualified immunity is intended to protect officers). The doctrine does, however, 
increase litigation costs and may deter injured persons from filing suit in the first place. Id. at 62. 
 4 William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 55–56 (2018). 
 5 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–55, 557 (1967). 
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overlooked common law precursors from the nineteenth century.6 According 
to Keller, these nineteenth-century doctrines provide the missing common 
law backdrop and help answer critics who have questioned the legal basis 
for immunity’s incorporation into modern civil rights law.7 In the course of 
his work, Keller identifies leading treatises from the latter third of the century 
and reminds us of the value of paying close attention to the past as we work 
to make sense of the present. 
This Essay will argue that in cataloging common law deference to some 
actions taken in good faith by executive branch officials, Keller has 
identified not a body of immunity law that shields official actors from 
liability when they transgress constitutional boundaries. Rather, he has 
identified a body of law best characterized today as administrative discretion. 
The doctrines Keller identifies operate much the way Chief Justice 
Marshall’s account of judicial review of executive actions operated in 
Marbury v. Madison.8 Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that matters 
lawfully assigned to the discretion of the executive branch were beyond the 
scope of judicial review. 9  Similarly, the common law occasionally 
incorporated notions of official good faith into the liability rule. But where 
an official’s lawful discretion ended and legal boundaries were transgressed, 
the common law was available (indeed obliged, according to Chief Justice 
Marshall) to supply a remedy.10 Because the Constitution operated to limit 
official discretion, there was no room for arguments about good faith when 
executive officials violated the Constitution. 
Part I of the Essay describes the manner in which common law courts 
deferred to the acts of executive officials within the zone of discretion 
conferred by the legislature. Government regulation, even in the nineteenth 
century, sometimes cast uncompensated burdens on regulated parties. But 
individuals had no right to recover for the cost of complying with 
government regulations so long as officials stayed within the zone of 
discretion legislatures had lawfully conferred. Like modern courts applying 
 
 6 Scott A. Keller, Qualified and Absolute Immunity at Common Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1344–
45 (2021). 
 7 See id. at 1344 n.34 (citing works refuted by his new account of the common law pedigree of 
qualified immunity). Keller cites a number of decisions from the last third of the nineteenth century; this 
brief reply will concentrate on leading cases from before the Civil War, seeing those as the more relevant 
backdrop to an 1871 enactment. For an important response to Keller and a more complete evaluation of 
his authorities, see William Baude, Is Quasi-Judicial Immunity Qualified Immunity?, 73 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3746068 [https://perma.cc/E3Q6-7FF8] (arguing 
that Keller identifies a body of quasi-judicial immunity that does not serve as a precursor to, and does not 
justify, modern qualified immunity law). 
 8 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803). 
 9 Id. at 166. 
 10 See id. at 170. 
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administrative law, nineteenth-century courts used the concept of discretion 
to help define lawful executive activity. When officials exceeded the scope 
of their discretion or committed positive government wrongs, they were held 
accountable. Contrary to Keller’s suggestion, there was no common law 
immunity—qualified or otherwise—when executive officials violated the 
law, a conclusion Keller’s treatises confirm. 
Part II describes the role that constitutional limits played in judicial 
assessments of the legality of official conduct. Such limits operated much 
the way statutory limits did—to confine the exercise of lawful discretion. 
Thus, for example, the Ohio officials who collected a state tax from the Bank 
of the United States in 1819 could not claim qualified immunity when they 
relied on an unconstitutional grant of state taxing authority. 11  The 
Constitution invalidated the state tax, stripped the officials of their official 
authority, and left them subject to liability at common law for trespass.12 That 
they doubtless acted in good faith in carrying out the state’s directive to seize 
the bank’s assets gave them no immunity from suit. Indeed, as this Essay 
concludes, Keller fails to establish that common law courts would extend to 
executive officers acting in good faith a discretionary authority to violate the 
Constitution. 
I. REEXAMINING THE ROLE OF DISCRETION AT COMMON LAW 
This Part seeks to situate the doctrines on which Keller relies in 
nineteenth-century common law rules of government accountability. Section 
A sets the stage by outlining the widespread reliance on common law writs 
that operated to impose liability on government officials. Some of these 
remedies operated—like injunctions today—to compel officers to take 
specified action. Some occasioned entry of judgments for money damages 
payable by the officer. But no doctrine of qualified immunity shielded 
executive officers from personal liability; instead, the legislature would 
protect government officers by providing indemnifying payments to cover 
the costs of any liability imposed. 
Section B draws on the nineteenth-century dispensation to better 
understand the rules that Keller characterizes as examples of qualified 
immunity. Much of what Keller points to in nineteenth-century law reflects 
judicial deference to lawful discretion in the review of official action. When 
officials enjoyed lawful discretion to act, they did not violate the law. The 
job of courts was to define the boundaries of that discretion by examining 
the statutory framework and invalidating official action that exceeded 
 
 11 See Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 777–79 (1824). 
 12 Id. at 869–71. 
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applicable limits. When the courts upheld official action, they concluded in 
effect that no law had been violated; qualified immunity played no role in 
the analysis.13 Outside the administrative sphere, when officials committed 
positive government wrongs by invading individual rights to property or 
personal liberty, they enjoyed no zone of lawful discretion. Section B 
concludes with a close reading of the treatises on which Keller relies, 
showing that they do not recognize any qualified immunity for executive 
officials. 
A. Government Accountability: A Primer 
To understand the rules of government accountability, we begin with 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.14 The doctrine, though far less 
immutable than some have suggested, was taken as a fact of life in the early 
republic;15 it meant that individuals who were wronged at the hands of the 
government could not bring suit against the government itself (except as the 
legislature so provided). 16  Immunity appears to have reflected an 
incongruous American fealty to the English adage that the king can do no 
wrong; after all, the Americans had broken with the king.17 It might be better 
understood as a reflection of the simple truth that, given the assembly’s 
control of the public purse, any payments from the fisc would require 
legislative approval.18 The common law of accountability thus depended on 
the availability of suits against officers of the government rather than against 
the government itself.19 
Such officer suits were commonly available through the writ system 
and, depending on the writ chosen, any resulting judgment might direct the 
officer to perform specific action (on pain of contempt) or to pay money to 
 
 13 See Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RSRV. L. 
REV. 396, 414–19, 422–30 (1987) (discussing the emergence of legality and discretionary models of 
official liability in the nineteenth century). 
 14 See James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment 
Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 963–64 (1997). 
 15 See id. at 939–42 (explaining that during the founding era, seven states—including New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia—established judicial modes for claims against the government). 
 16 On the origins of sovereign immunity in England and its “mysteri[ous]” introduction into the 
United States, where kings and royal prerogatives are unknown, see Edwin M. Borchard, Government 
Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924). 
 17 See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 1–19 (1963) (describing Crown immunity under the English dispensation and observing mildly 
that the Americans had expelled the Crown). 
 18 On the importance of Congress’s role as master of the purse strings in the recognition of sovereign 
immunity, see Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1259 (2009). 
 19 See Jaffe, supra note 17, at 20–26; Borchard, supra note 16, at 6; Pfander, supra note 14, at 966–
71. 
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the plaintiff. 20  Consider, for example, the writ of habeas corpus, which 
commanded the warden to bring a prisoner to court (along with a description 
of the cause of confinement).21 If the court was unsatisfied with the proffered 
justification of confinement, the prisoner went free. Consider, as well, the 
prerogative writs of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition.22 (1) Mandamus 
directed the officer to perform specified ministerial actions required by law; 
(2) certiorari tested (usually after the fact) whether a board or tribunal had 
jurisdiction to issue a challenged order or decree and invalidated the action 
taken outside of the jurisdictional boundaries; (3) prohibition, issued at the 
outset of a proceeding, barred an inferior judicial body from taking up a 
dispute over which it lacked authority.23 These writs obliged the government 
to comply with the law by operating on the officers named as defendants.24 
Such proceedings were not thought to implicate any qualified immunity from 
suit on the part of the officer or any sovereign immunity from suit on the part 
of the government.25 
 
 20 For reliance on contempt sanctions (or “body attachment,” as it was then known) to enforce 
specific decrees of habeas, mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition, see James E. Pfander & Jacob P. 
Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1314 & n.268, 1350 & 
n.502, 1351 & n.508 (2020). 
 21 On the history of habeas, tracing its origins in England and incorporation into the practices of the 
United States, see generally AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF 
LONDON TO GUANTANAMO BAY (2017). 
 22 For an overview of the nineteenth-century handling of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari, see 
Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 20, at 1311–18 (collecting authority). For a restatement of those 
principles, see Wilson v. Mayor of New-York, 1 Abb. Pr. 4, 18–19 (N.Y. C.P. 1854) (describing mandamus 
as issuing where “a party has a legal right, and there is no other appropriate legal remedy” but noting that 
mandamus does not lie when “under the particular statute relied upon by the plaintiffs, there [is] a 
discretion given to the defendants”). A court has described the role of certiorari as “the chief means by 
which [state courts would] review administrative action” throughout the nineteenth century. Frank J. 
Goodnow, The Writ of Certiorari, 6 POL. SCI. Q. 493, 493 (1891); see 4 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL 
ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 360–61 (2d ed. 1791); Lawton v. Comm’rs of Highways, 2 Cai. 179, 
182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804). Prohibition was a powerful remedy to stay an improper proceeding, but courts 
did not necessarily regard it as available to oversee the work of boards and commissions. See Pfander & 
Wentzel, supra note 20, at 1317–18, 1317 n.310. 
 23 On the origins of the prerogative writs, see S.A. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION 584 app. I at 586 (J.M. Evans ed., 4th ed. 1980). 
 24  On the effectiveness of contempt sanctions in litigation against the federal government, see 
Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial 
Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 703, 780 (2018). 
 25 Under the party-of-record rule, litigation could proceed against officers of the Crown without 
implicating the Crown’s immunity on the theory that it was the Crown itself, acting through the courts, 
that demanded an accounting from its officials. See generally Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 20, at 1335–
37. On the accountability of the government officer at common law, see James E. Pfander, Dicey’s 
Nightmare: An Essay on the Rule of Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 737, 744–47, 754–56, 762–66 (2019). 
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Individuals could also proceed against government officials with writs 
of trespass, assumpsit, and ejectment.26 Trespass provided remedies when the 
government invaded an individual’s common law rights to personal integrity 
or property ownership. Seizure, arrest, and prosecution could occasion a 
false imprisonment or malicious prosecution claim; the unauthorized taking 
of property could lead to a trespass action.27 Taxpayers, such as those who 
imported goods into the United States and were obliged to pay customs 
duties, could challenge the amount of the collected tax by paying under 
protest and bringing suit to recover the disputed payment through an 
assumpsit action against the official collector of the customs.28 If the court 
agreed that the tax was unlawful, it would so decree and award a judgment 
to “recover back the money so paid.”29 Common lawsuits could also seek to 
eject government officials from land owned by the plaintiff.30 
Executive officials did not enjoy any qualified (or absolute) immunity 
from such suits. Thus, in Marbury v. Madison, the Court recounted the 
common law framework for mandamus proceedings and confirmed the 
absence of any immunity for defendant officials.31 Under that framework, the 
Court characterized Madison’s duty to deliver a legally valid commission as 
nondiscretionary, or ministerial, an act which the law could compel Madison 
to perform.32  Madison could claim no immunity from suit, as the Court 
explained: 
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under color of his 
office, by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that his 
 
 26 For a summary of the operation of these common law writs, see James E. Pfander & Andrew G. 
Borrasso, Public Rights and Article III: Judicial Oversight of Agency Action, 82 OHIO ST. L.J 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 20), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3867839 [https://perma.cc/J639-
FZAJ]. 
 27 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 176, 179 (1804) (holding a federal officer liable for 
trespass to allow recovery for seizure of property); Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439, 453, 457 (1836) 
(granting recovery for false imprisonment for arrest and imprisonment on mistaken grounds). 
 28 See Woolhandler, supra note 13, at 414 n.87 (confirming that assumpsit was available to recover 
taxes paid under protest); Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 156 (1836) (holding that assumpsit 
lies to recover back taxes paid under protest). 
 29 See Wilson v. Mayor of New-York, 1 Abb. Pr. 4, 26–27 (N.Y. C.P. 1854) (citing, among others, 
Amesbury Woollen & Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Inhabitants of Amesbury, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 461 (1821)). 
 30 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 221, 223 (1882) (authorizing an ejectment suit to oust 
federal military officials from possession of land that was to become Arlington National Cemetery). 
 31 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163–65, 168–69 (1803). 
 32 On the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts for mandamus purposes, see FLOYD 
R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS § 611 (1890) (explaining that 
“courts will not undertake to control official discretion or the performance of doubtful or uncertain duties, 
but where the duty to perform a ministerial act is clearly and imperatively imposed upon such an officer, 
the courts will enforce its performance by mandamus”). 
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office alone exempts him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding, 
and being compelled to obey the judgment of the law.33 
 As with mandamus proceedings, so too with suits for damages. 
Officials who committed positive government wrongs by violating an 
individual’s rights, 34  such as the illegal capture of the ship in Little v. 
Barreme35 or the false arrest of a subordinate for stealing from the U.S. mail 
in Merriam v. Mitchell,36 were subject to personal liability for trespass or 
false imprisonment.37 Captain Little sought to justify his actions by pointing 
to grants of authority, but the Court concluded that the applicable federal 
statute had not (and a presidential directive could not have) conferred legal 
authority.38 Similarly, Mitchell was held liable for causing the arrest of a 
subordinate, despite the fact that Mitchell was carrying out orders from his 
supervisors to investigate thefts from the mail in Maine.39 Both Little and 
Mitchell argued with some force that they acted in good faith. But both the 
Supreme Court of the United States (in Little) and the Supreme Court of 
Maine (in Mitchell) rejected the arguments for a good faith defense. 40 
 
 33 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. 
 34 See Woolhandler, supra note 13, at 403 n.31. 
 35 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 170 (1804). 
 36 See Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439, 439, 444–45, 458 (1836). 
 37 In both instances, Congress indemnified the defendants, holding them harmless for liability they 
incurred in the line of duty. See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: 
Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1902 
(2010) (describing Little’s indemnification); James E. Pfander, Suits Against Officeholders, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 360, 361–63 (Karen Orren & John W. 
Compton eds., 2018) (describing Mitchell’s indemnification). 
 38 Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177–79. 
 39 Merriam, 13 Me. at 457–58. 
 40 See Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179; Merriam, 13 Me. at 457. Keller argues that Little represents 
an application of the rule that actions in clear absence of jurisdiction subjected even an officer with some 
discretionary authority to liability. Keller, supra note 6, at 1353–54. But the Court did not explicitly 
invoke that clear absence standard in Little, and Chief Justice Marshall’s account of his own thinking 
suggests that the issue resolved in Little was one involving the proper allocation of decision-making 
authority among the branches of government. Had the Court conferred a good faith immunity in Little, as 
Chief Justice Marshall suggested, then the claim by the owner of the Flying Fish would run against the 
U.S. government and would, as Chief Justice Marshall explained, thereby become a “proper subject for 
negotiation.” Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179. Chief Justice Marshall had been Secretary of State under 
President John Adams during negotiations over congressional payment of compensation to the owners of 
a British vessel in 1799. See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 37, at 1894, 1901 n.174. But Jefferson and 
Madison took the position that the determination of such claims required a judicial decision on legality 
preliminary to consideration by Congress of the passage of indemnifying legislation. Id. at 1895–1900. 
Chief Justice Marshall thus acquiesced not in a finding that Little acted in clear absence of jurisdiction 
but in a conception of the proper role of the courts in passing on questions of legality. Had Chief Justice 
Marshall and the Court recognized a good faith defense, the federal courts would have no occasion to 
consider the strict legality of the action and victims of government wrongdoing would have been forced 
to apply to Congress for the payment of compensation. 
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Military officers under orders to arrest civilians during the War of 1812 were 
similarly held personally liable and denied any good faith exemption from 
trespass liability.41 
Courts justified their refusal to recognize any good faith immunity by 
pointing to the nineteenth-century practice through which legislative 
assemblies indemnified government officials for liability they incurred for 
actions taken in the line of duty.42 The practice of indemnity was established 
quite early at the federal level, as Madison and Jefferson worked to secure 
legislation to pay the damages awarded against naval officials who (like 
Captain Little) had been held liable for wrongful actions during the Quasi-
War with France.43 The institutionalization of indemnity practice meant, in 
effect, that officers had a right to reimbursement from the government for 
any personal liability imposed by the court, much the way officers then and 
now were represented in court by attorneys hired by the federal 
government.44 Such a practice did not shield officers from liability and did 
not prevent the court from reaching the merits. Instead, indemnity neatly 
shifted the cost of government wrongdoing to the fisc, thereby enabling the 
courts to adjudicate issues of legality and afford redress to victims of 
government wrongdoing, free of sovereign immunity, without deference to 
executive claims of necessity or to arguments about legal uncertainty. 
Legislatures exercised some discretion in granting indemnity, accepting 
financial responsibility for some official wrongdoing but refusing to 
indemnify in situations where the officer had acted outside the line of duty. 
A study of the practice during the early republic suggests that, like Little and 
Mitchell, roughly two-thirds of the federal officials held accountable in suits 
for money secured indemnity from Congress.45 
 
 41 See Pfander, supra note 25, at 775–76 (describing successful trespass claims against military 
officers who arrested U.S. citizens for aiding the British during the War of 1812). 
 42 See Imlay v. Sands, 1 Cai. 566, 567–68, 573 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (explaining that the judicial task 
in such cases was “to pronounce the law as we find it” and to “leave cases of hardship, where any exist, 
to legislative provision”). 
 43 See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 37, at 1877–87, 1894–1903 (describing the American interdiction 
of foreign shipping during the Quasi-War with France and the role of Madison and Jefferson in allocating 
institutional responsibility as between the courts and the legislature for the adjudication of claims and the 
grant of indemnity). 
 44 On the officer’s right to indemnity, see Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 98–99 (1836) 
(admitting that application for indemnity might cause some “personal inconvenience” for officers held 
legally accountable but “no eventual hardship” because “the government in such cases is bound to 
indemnify the officer”); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 263 (1845) (describing the government as 
bound to indemnify for liability incurred under instructions). In the personal liability suits that grew out 
of the Quasi-War, naval officers were typically represented in court by government lawyers. See Pfander 
& Hunt, supra note 37, at 1897–1901 (recounting the litigation against officers Maley and Murray). 
 45 See Pfander & Hunt, supra note 37, at 1867. 
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The nineteenth-century system of government accountability thus made 
a distinctive allocation of authority among the three branches of government, 
as Justice Story explained in the course of providing redress for maritime 
torts committed by federal government officials: 
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the high discretion 
confided to the executive, for great public purposes, to act on a sudden 
emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief, by summary measures, which 
are not found in the text of the laws. Such measures are properly matters of 
state, and if the responsibility is taken, under justifiable circumstances, the 
Legislature will doubtless apply a proper indemnity. But this Court can only 
look to the questions, whether the laws have been violated; and if they were, 
justice demands, that the injured party should receive a suitable redress.46 
For Justice Story, then, the government will sometimes act in violation of the 
law. But the courts cannot grant qualified immunity to shield officers from 
liability; courts must enforce the law. Officers acting in good faith were in 
need of protection from personal liability, but they were not given a judicial 
immunity from liability; rather, they were expected to apply to the legislature 
for indemnity. 
B. The Role of Discretion and the Ultra Vires Principle 
Notwithstanding the absence of qualified immunity at common law, 
courts conducting judicial review of official action recognized zones of 
official discretion within which officers were free to exercise their best 
judgment without judicial oversight. One can see these zones of discretion at 
work in modern treatments of administrative law. Under the ultra vires 
principle, courts act properly when they invalidate agency action that 
exceeds legislative boundaries but defer to agency decisions taken within 
those legislative boundaries.47 As it was applied in the nineteenth-century 
common law world, the ultra vires principle helps explain the scope of 
review available in suits seeking remedies for official misconduct. 
Mandamus at common law reached only ministerial matters when the legal 
duty was clearly defined by law; under this writ, decisions rightly assigned 
to executive discretion were beyond judicial review. Writs of prohibition 
were sometimes issued to quasi-judicial boards and commissions. But such 
writs served only to remedy action in excess of jurisdiction, rather than to 
review discretionary judgments made within the inferior tribunal’s 
 
 46 The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 366–67 (1824). 
 47 See Paul Craig, Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 63, 64–
65 (1998) (describing the ultra vires principle as a way to enforce legislative limits on official action so 
that, for example, “an institution given power . . . to adjudicate on employment matters should not take 
jurisdiction over non-employment matters”). 
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acknowledged authority, and certiorari was thought to provide for direct 
review of jurisdictional and legal errors but not the lawful exercise of 
discretion.48 
Something quite similar to the ultra vires principle also shaped the relief 
available in suits for money damages against government officials. As we 
have seen, suits brought in trespass, assumpsit, replevin, and the like 
triggered an assessment of the legality of official conduct and directed the 
payment of damages or the proper disposition of property.49 But as with 
specific remedies like mandamus and certiorari, trespass and assumpsit 
litigation proceeded on the basis that officers who stayed within the 
boundaries of their legal discretion did not violate positive law. For example, 
customs officers and other tax collectors were subject to liability in 
assumpsit if they collected tax payments in violation of law.50 But when the 
law obliged the tax collector to make a discretionary judgment of how much 
payment was to be collected—such as with a discretionary valuation of the 
property subject to taxation—and did not supply an obligatory legal standard 
for making that valuation, assumpsit would not lie to review the valuation 
decision.51  In such cases, the officers did not enjoy qualified immunity; 
rather, their exercise of discretion within the boundaries legislatively 
assigned did not violate the law. 
In much of the authority Keller highlights in support of his theory that 
the common law recognized an immunity doctrine, courts were defining 
lawful zones of executive discretion as conferred by statute rather than 
creating a common law exemption from liability for those who violated the 
law. Consider Otis v. Watkins52 and Crowell v. McFadon,53 two antebellum 
cases on which Keller relies.54 Both cases arose from Jefferson’s embargo, 
legislation that barred U.S. merchants, many located in Federalist New 
 
 48 See Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 20, at 1299–1303 (describing the function of the writs of 
mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition). 
 49 See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
 50 See Wilson v. Mayor of New-York, 1 Abb. Pr. 4, 27 (N.Y. C.P. 1854) (citing, among others, 
Amesbury Woollen & Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Inhabitants of Amesbury, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 461 (1821)). 
 51 See Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 263, 272–73 (1854) (denying assumpsit to contest the 
valuation assigned to imported goods). See generally Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the 
Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on 
Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L.J. 1288, 1304 (2021) (describing the broad discretion 
assigned to federal tax assessors, whom Congress charged with assigning a “just and equitable” value for 
tax purposes to every house and farm in the union). 
 52 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 339 (1815). 
 53 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 94 (1814). 
 54 Keller, supra note 6, at 1368–69. 
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England, from exporting goods to Great Britain.55 Contrary to what Keller 
suggests, the Court’s decision to deny recovery in both cases did not rest on 
a common law doctrine of qualified immunity. Instead, the Court based its 
decisions on the language of the statute, which authorized collectors of the 
customs “to detain any vessel ostensibly bound with a cargo to some other 
port of the United States, whenever in their opinion the intention is to violate 
or evade any of the provisions of the acts laying an embargo.”56 By virtue of 
having authorized detention based on the “opinion[s]” of the collectors, the 
Act was interpreted to confer a zone of discretion on the collector and to bar 
recovery even when the opinion might be fairly contestable. 57  Such an 
interpretation of the Act was not inevitable; Chief Justice Marshall dissented 
in Otis on the basis that the collector’s opinion must be reasonably based on 
the evidence adduced.58  But no one contended that Congress lacked the 
power to confer such discretion or that such discretion, once lawfully 
conferred, was subject to judicial override. Nor did anyone contend that the 
common law, absent the adoption of a statute, would have exempted the 
officer from liability. 
In another case on which Keller relies,59 Wilkes v. Dinsman, denial of 
recovery for the plaintiff was based on a finding that the defendant official 
had acted within the zone of discretion, placing the action outside of judicial 
review. 60  There, a marine came to what he regarded as the end of his 
enlistment during a voyage Congress had authorized for purposes of 
“commerce and science.”61 Concluding that the marine had reenlisted for the 
duration and had no right to refuse service, the commander had him whipped 
and imprisoned on shore.62 In the suit for damages that followed, the Court 
drew an explicit analogy to the writ of mandamus in denying recovery.63 For 
the Court, the defendant was best understood as a nonministerial, quasi-
 
 55 On the politics of Jefferson’s embargo and its impact on New England, see generally GORDON S. 
WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 647–58 (2009). 
 56 Crowell, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 95 (citing Act of April 25, 1808, ch. 66, § 11, 2 Stat. 499, 501); 
Otis, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch), at 346 (same). 
 57 See Otis, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 355–56. For evidence that “opinion” was a term of art understood 
to confer discretion on executive officers, see Kevin Arlyck, Delegation, Administration, and 
Improvisation, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 25), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802760 [https://perma.cc/EH5C-H3YT] (quoting a provision of the Remission 
Act of 1790 that conferred complete discretion on the Treasury to remit any penalty if in the Secretary’s 
“opinion” the penalty had been incurred without fraudulent intent). 
 58 See Otis, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 357–58 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
 59 See Keller, supra note 6, at 1361–63. 
 60 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 132 (1849). 
 61 See id. at 122–23. 
 62 Id. at 122. 
 63 Id. at 129. 
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judicial officer, whose exercise of discretion in the course of his command 
was not subject to judicial review.64 
Hence, while an officer acts within the limits of that discretion, the same law 
which gives it to him will protect him in the exercise of it. But for acts beyond 
his jurisdiction, or attended by circumstances of excessive severity, arising from 
ill-will, a depraved disposition, or vindictive feeling, he can claim no 
exemption, and should be allowed none under color of his office, however 
elevated or however humble the victim.65 
The decision thus followed the common law in reaffirming the judicial role 
in policing jurisdictional boundaries but leaving officials free to act, without 
malice, within their zone of discretion.66 
Discretion, rather than immunity, remained central to the judicial 
review of official action, even as late as the 1896 decision in Spalding v. 
Vilas,67 on which Keller relies.68 In Spalding, the Court rejected an attempt 
by an attorney to secure damages for the losses he allegedly suffered due to 
the implementation of a new policy by the postal service.69 Carrying out the 
new policy, the postal official sent circulars to former post office employees, 
explaining that they were entitled to direct receipt of back pay and were not 
obligated to retain counsel to secure such payments.70 The plaintiff alleged 
that the circular made it more difficult for him to collect his fees from the 
postal workers he represented, was defamatory in some respects, and was the 
product of malice on the defendant’s part.71 The Court treated the postal 
official as a quasi-judicial official, operating within a zone of discretion in 
deciding how best to administer the policy that Congress had specified when 
it authorized the direct payment of back pay.72 Concluding that the official 
had carried out this policy within the limits of his lawful discretion, the Court 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim.73 
 
 64 See id. at 129. 
 65 Id. at 130. 
 66 Keller ascribes some significance to the role malice played in the common law scheme, comparing 
it with the good faith inquiry that informed the analysis of qualified immunity before Harlow switched to 
an objective standard. See Keller, supra note 6, at 1390–91. But in cases from the nineteenth century such 
as Little and Mitchell, good faith does not shield an officer from liability for violation of law. Instead, bad 
faith can make unlawful an official act that would otherwise lie within the zone of discretion. See Little 
v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804); Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439, 458 (1836). 
 67 See 161 U.S. 483, 498–99 (1896). 
 68 See Keller, supra note 6, at 1363–64. 
 69 See Spalding, 161 U.S. at 483. For an account of the decision, see Pfander, supra note 37, at 364–
67. 
 70 Spalding, 161 U.S. at 484. 
 71 Id. at 486. 
 72 See id. at 498–99. 
 73 Id. at 499. 
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Had the postal official invaded the plaintiff’s common law interests, 
committing a positive government wrong, the matter may have been more 
complicated. As it was, the Spalding Court found no taking of property or 
defamation of character, but only an exercise of official discretion that cast 
new burdens on the plaintiff.74 Had the plaintiff made out such tort claims, 
the Court would have faced the question from Wilkes v. Dinsman: whether 
Congress had conferred a zone of discretion within which a government 
official was empowered to commit what might otherwise constitute a 
common law tort (such as defamation or false imprisonment).75 Within that 
framework, Wilkes suggests that a showing of malice could change the result 
even where the official enjoyed some discretion. In short, rather than a 
common law immunity from liability based on the officer’s good faith, the 
cases on which Keller relies consistently focus on the language of the 
operative statute and the scope of discretion it confers on the officer. 
Given all that, one might ask where Keller locates the immunities from 
official liability to which he points. He begins by identifying absolute 
immunities for certain government officials, including legislators, judges, 
and high-ranking executive officials (presidents, governors). 76  I have no 
quibble with those assertions; indeed, absolute legislative and judicial 
immunities survive in current law without serious controversy.77 Keller then 
argues that rank-and-file executive branch officials also received a form of 
qualified immunity comparable to that conferred on those officers today.78 
But in doing so, Keller simply applies the label “qualified immunity” to a 
range of common law tort doctrines that either demanded a showing of 
malice by the plaintiff as a condition of recovery (such as the tort of 
malicious prosecution) or recognized that action taken within the official’s 
zone of legislatively conferred discretion might violate the law if 
accompanied by malice or bad faith.79 In other words, rather than identify a 
 
 74 See id. at 498 (acknowledging that payments directly to clients, bypassing the attorney, would 
complicate the collection of fees but treating as evidently “clear” that such difficulties were not 
actionable). 
 75 See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text. 
 76 See Keller, supra note 6, at 1355–58, 1360. 
 77 See generally Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (recognizing legislative immunity); 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (affirming judicial immunity). For an evaluation of Stump, 
arguing that the judge in question may have exceeded his jurisdiction, see JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES 
OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 273–74 (3d ed. 2017). I am puzzled, given Chief Justice Marshall’s statement 
in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803), as to why Keller argues that cabinet officers 
were thought to enjoy some form of absolute immunity. See Keller, supra note 6, at 1360. 
 78 Keller, supra note 6, at 1368. 
 79 Id. at 1374–75. On the elements of malicious prosecution, see MECHEM, supra note 32, at § 903 
(reciting elements of malicious prosecution as requiring plaintiff to show termination of prosecution in 
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nineteenth-century body of law that qualifiedly immunizes executive 
officials who violated the rights of individuals, Keller has identified a 
collection of cases in which no violation was thought to occur. 
Keller argues that the labels do not much matter, making it appropriate 
to treat decisions that denied relief on the merits as if they applied forms of 
“immunity.” Throughout the paper, in keeping with this no-big-deal 
approach, Keller interpolates the language of qualified immunity into 
descriptions of doctrines that prevented the imposition of liability on other 
grounds. In justifying such interpolations, Keller points in a footnote to four 
nineteenth-century treatises—Cooley, Bishop, Mechem, and Throop. 80 
Keller tells us that these treatises use “interchangeable labels” such as 
“exemption from liability” and “immunity from civil action” to describe 
forms of official immunity.81 Notably, however, the quoted sections of the 
treatises discuss only the immunity doctrines applicable to legislators and 
judges and do not use the terms interchangeably to describe executive 
officers’ immunity.82 For example, Keller quotes sections 709 and 713 of the 
Throop treatise, which use the terms “no liability” and “immunity” to discuss 
suits against certain officials. But when we examine the quoted sections, we 
learn that section 709 deals with legislators and section 713 deals with 
judges.83 
The same pattern recurs in Keller’s use of the other treatises. Thus, 
Keller quotes section 376 of Cooley, which deals with legislators;84 sections 
777 and 781 of Bishop (legislators and judges, respectively);85 and sections 
621 and 638 of Mechem (judges).86 The absolute immunity these officials 
enjoyed was categorically absent from the treatment accorded executive 
 
plaintiff’s favor, lack of probable cause, and malicious motives). On the role of malice in taking official 
action outside an otherwise applicable zone of discretion, see the discussion of Wilkes v. Dinsman, supra 
note 60. 
 80 See Keller, supra note 6, at 1345 n.43 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 376 (1879); JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE NON-CONTRACT LAW AND ESPECIALLY AS TO COMMON AFFAIRS NOT OF 
CONTRACT OR THE EVERY-DAY RIGHTS AND TORTS §§ 777, 781 (1889); MECHEM, supra note 32, 
§§ 621, 638; MONTGOMERY H. THROOP, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO PUBLIC OFFICERS AND 
SURETIES IN OFFICIAL BONDS §§ 709, 713 (1892)). 
 81 See Keller, supra note 6, at 1345 n.43. 
 82 See id. (citing COOLEY, supra note 80, at 376 (discussing immunity of legislators); BISHOP, supra 
note 80, §§ 777, 781 (discussing immunities for legislators and judges respectively); MECHEM, supra 
note 32, §§ 621, 638 (discussing immunities for judges and quasi-judicial officers respectively); THROOP, 
supra note 80, §§ 709, 713 (discussing immunities for legislative and judicial and quasi-judicial acts 
respectively)). 
 83 THROOP, supra note 80, §§ 709, 713. 
 84 COOLEY, supra note 80, at 376. 
 85 BISHOP, supra note 80, §§ 777, 781. 
 86 MECHEM, supra note 32, §§ 621, 638. 
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officials, a conclusion Keller’s own treatises confirm. Thus, in a discussion 
that Keller does not quote, section 712 of the Throop treatise explains that 
“executive officers . . . are liable to private actions for misconduct.”87  In 
short, from the evidence Keller puts forward, it appears that nineteenth-
century treatise writers took the position that only legislators and judges—
and perhaps some high-ranking executive officers, such as presidents and 
governors—enjoyed what was understood as an immunity from suit. 
Otherwise, executive officials were subject to liability when they violated 
the law (although the law, as we have seen, might confer discretion on the 
officers in some instances). 
Here’s why Keller’s choices matter. Plaintiffs today claiming that they 
were subjected to, say, a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment must 
show that police officers used force that was objectively unreasonable.88 As 
elaborated in Graham v. Connor, the “‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of 
force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene . . . [taking account of] circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving.”89 Even where the plaintiff has successfully established the 
elements of a viable claim on the merits, the officer may nonetheless avoid 
liability by invoking the qualified immunity defense. Keller treats 
nineteenth-century cases where courts factored in reasonableness and good 
faith into their decisions on the merits as if they were recognizing a qualified 
immunity from suit. But qualified immunity goes beyond the liability rule. 
It affords the officer wholesale protection from liability for unconstitutional 
conduct unless the plaintiff can furnish evidence of the existence of prior 
“clearly established” law.90 
Keller does not defend the clearly established law standard as such by 
reference to nineteenth-century developments. But however formulated, 
modern immunity doctrine departs from its supposed nineteenth-century 
precursors in four important ways. First, as with any objective standard, like 
the clearly established law standard, qualified immunity assigns the lower 
federal courts primary responsibility for protecting officers from undue 
personal liability. In doing so, instead of sending close cases to the jury for 
resolution, as courts did in the nineteenth century, modern courts keep close 
 
 87 See THROOP, supra note 80, § 712. 
 88 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
 89 Id. at 396–97. Will Baude makes a similar point, observing that modern debates focus on the 
qualified immunity of law enforcement officers, who clearly lacked any qualified immunity in the 
nineteenth century. See Baude, supra note 7, at 4–5. 
 90 Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Boldest Lie, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 618 (2021). On 
the challenges posed by the standard of clearly established law, see id. at 613, 618 (noting the difficulty 
of finding prior cases with nearly identical facts to meet the standard). 
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cases away from the jury.91 Second, modern qualified immunity applies to all 
constitutional tort claims for money damages, thus incorporating an across-
the-board liability shield to all government activity. 92  By contrast, the 
common law adopted a more nuanced approach, selectively incorporating 
inquiries into good faith and malice to take account of the specific claim at 
issue. 93  In many instances, as with trespass, ejectment, and assumpsit 
liability, the officer’s good faith was entirely irrelevant.94 Third, qualified 
immunity law puts the courts, rather than the political branches, in charge of 
fashioning protections and incentives for government officials. That sharply 
contrasts with nineteenth-century practice in which legislatures were 
responsible for shaping official incentives through salary and fee packages, 
legislative grants of official discretion, and the provision of indemnity to 
officers held liable for action taken in the line of duty.95 Fourth, modern-day 
qualified immunity applies to violations of constitutional norms, something 
for which (as the next Part makes clear) one finds no obvious nineteenth-
century analog. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON OFFICIAL DISCRETION 
Keller suggests either that the rules of qualified immunity may have 
applied to suits seeking damages for the violation of constitutional norms or 
that they were sensibly extended to constitutional tort litigation after Section 
 
 91 Compare Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439, 458 (1836) (deferring to jury’s award of damages 
against federal officer, notwithstanding officer’s assertion of good faith as defense), with Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (reformulating the immunity standard in objective terms to facilitate 
greater judicial control of suits against federal government officials). 
 92 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 264 (2000) 
(describing qualified immunity as a comprehensive doctrine that applies across the board and does not 
take account of the specific duties of government officials). 
 93  As noted, malicious prosecution required a showing of malice. See supra notes 67–79 and 
accompanying text. In some cases, courts would imply malice from the deliberate character of the 
officer’s actions in violating the plaintiff’s rights. See Merriam, 13 Me. at 458. 
 94 For trespass, see Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178–79 (1804); Merriam, 13 Me. at 
442. For assumpsit, see Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 263, 272–73 (1854). For ejectment, see 
generally United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). 
 95 For a discussion of official compensation and incentives, see generally NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, 
AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 
(2013) (describing a nineteenth-century world in which officers earned fees, salaries, and portions of the 
value of forfeited property, depending on the task at hand); cf. James E. Pfander, Judicial Compensation 
and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (describing 
the way salary-based judicial compensation incentivized courts of limited jurisdiction to reject new 
judicial business). On legislative control of discretion and indemnity, see supra notes 42–45, 52–66 and 
accompanying text. 
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1983 became law in 1871.96 But the federal courts of the early republic do 
not appear to have conferred any immunity on defendant officials who 
committed positive government wrongs in violation of the Constitution. This 
Part of the Essay sketches the (immunity-free) model of constitutional 
litigation in the early republic and then steps back to evaluate the impact of 
constitutional limits on official discretion. 
In the early nineteenth century, the Constitution operated less as a 
vehicle for direct assertion of constitutional claims than as a check on the 
authority claimed by government actors.97 The Constitution does not confer 
explicit rights to sue; it was framed on the assumption that the common law 
writ system was available to secure the enforcement of important 
constitutional rights. For example, the habeas non-suspension guarantee 
seemingly assumes the existence of a well-functioning writ and prohibits 
government suspensions except during times of rebellion or invasion. 98 
Similarly, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
do not empower individuals to sue, but they do impose due process limits on 
legislative denial of all effective rights to sue.99 Rather than providing for 
direct enforcement, then, the Constitution often came into play as a 
restriction on the authority defendant governments and their officers might 
claim in response to common law claims of various kinds.100 
If less salient as a source of the right to sue, the Constitution nonetheless 
operated as a robust limit on the zone of official discretion lawfully conferred 
 
 96 See Keller, supra note 6, at 1344–45 (framing his article as offering evidence of a nineteenth-
century body of qualified immunity law that the Court might rightly draw upon in providing officials with 
a defense to liability under § 1983). 
 97 See, e.g., Merriam, 13 Me. at 457 (treating reparation for false arrest as compelled by the “plainest 
dictates of common justice” rather than by constitutional compulsion). The right to sue was understood 
as an element of the common law. Consider two nineteenth-century decisions drawing on common law 
norms to fashion remedies against federal officers. Compare Crowell v. McFadon, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 
94, 98 (1814) (rejecting owner’s claim for conversion of cargo in connection with the lawful detention of 
a ship under the embargo act), with Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 12–13 (1817) (allowing 
owner of ship detained under embargo act to replevy cargo out of the hands of officer). 
 98 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. See generally TYLER, supra note 21, at 137–38 (acknowledging 
that one could read the habeas non-suspension clause to create an affirmative constitutional guarantee of 
federal habeas, but noting that Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the provision in Ex parte Bollman as 
one that only imposed constitutional limits on the exercise of habeas authority that had previously been 
conferred by written law). 
 99 See PFANDER, supra note 77, at 405–07. 
 100 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Rights, Jurisdiction to Enforce Rights, and Entitlements 
to Remedies: An Exercise in Dialectic for the Twenty-First Century (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 
32–43) (on file with author). For an account on constitutional tort claims before Bivens, see Carlos M. 
Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 531–37 (2013) (describing what the authors call the “common law cause of 
action/federal defense” model of litigation in the nineteenth century). 
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by statute.101 Consider, for example, the Court’s approach to the litigation 
over the constitutionality of Ohio’s decision to impose a tax on the Bank of 
the United States in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.102 State officials 
were authorized and directed to collect the tax and did so by levying distress 
on the property of the Bank. Distress, of course, had long been a recognized 
mode of tax collection; when individuals failed to pay the taxes owed, 
sheriffs and marshals were empowered to levy distress—that is, to seize and 
sell the taxpayer’s property in satisfaction of the obligation.103 So long as the 
officials, both in imposing the tax and in levying on property to secure 
payment, stayed within the bounds of official discretion, their actions were 
lawful. But if the tax was invalid, the law did not properly authorize distress, 
or the officers strayed from their line of duty in levying distress, trespass 
remedies were available at common law.104 
The Bank sued in trespass, arguing that Ohio lacked power under the 
Constitution to impose a tax on an instrumentality of the United States105 (as 
the Court had previously found in McCulloch v. Maryland).106 The Bank also 
sought injunctive relief, arguing that it was entitled to restrain what was in 
effect the destruction of its franchise by the taking of its property—an 
argument aided by the size of the tax levy and the difficulty of recovering 
money directly from state officials after it had been intermingled with other 
 
 101  With common law available to supply important remedies for government misconduct, the 
Constitution operated as a check on legislative interference with common law norms. In a recent defense 
of qualified immunity, Judge Oldham argues that a variety of statutes conferred forms of immunity on 
local officials including sheriffs, constables, and customs officials in seventeenth-century England. See 
generally Andrew S. Oldham, Official Immunity at the Founding (Apr. 12, 2021) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3824983 [https://perma.cc/HA7Y-UYGW]. Oldham suggests 
that the Fourth Amendment took such developments on board, making room for the creation of official 
protections. Id. at 19. But in describing the provision of statutory immunities, Oldham tells us little about 
how the common law operates in the absence of any statutory intervention. See id. at 2–3. Critics of 
qualified immunity do not deny that Congress could write some forms of officer protection into positive 
law. Cf. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1980) (recognizing a common law doctrine 
that “merely prevented courts from substituting their own judgment on matters within the lawful 
discretion of the municipality” but reaffirming that “a municipality has no ‘discretion’ to violate the 
Federal Constitution; its dictates are absolute and imperative”). 
 102 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). The relative dearth of similar suits affirmatively challenging the 
legality of state action may reflect the relative paucity of applicable rights. See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor of 
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833) (concluding that the Bill of Rights did not bind the states). 
 103 For the history of distress, see Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) 272, 284 (1855); Parrillo, supra note 51, at 93–95. 
 104 For an account of nineteenth-century remedies for wrongful distress, see Pfander & Borrasso, 
supra note 26, at 20–22. 
 105 Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 739–40. 
 106 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 437 (1819) (invalidating Maryland tax on 
the Bank of the United States as an instrumentality of the United States). 
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assets in the state’s treasury.107 The Ohio officials justified their actions by 
pointing to Ohio law and argued that they were entitled to levy distress to 
collect a lawful tax.108 The Court’s reasoning ranged widely in the course of 
resolving the dispute but started with the proposition that if, as construed in 
McColluch, the Constitution invalidated the Ohio tax, it would deprive the 
officers of any lawful authority to levy distress on the Bank’s property.109 
Indeed, Ohio officials were reported to have “expressly waive[d] the 
extravagant proposition, that a void act can afford protection to the person 
who executes it,” and had thus admitted they would, in such a case, face 
liability to the bank “to the extent of the injury sustained, in an action at 
law.” 110  The Constitution thus set a limit to lawful official action, and 
officials who exceeded constitutional limits (however well-intentioned) were 
thought to enjoy no residual discretion within which to act lawfully or, in 
Keller’s terms, no immunity from suit. 
This approach to constitutional restrictions on the scope of lawful 
official authority was routinely applied throughout the nineteenth century. In 
a series of state court cases, officials were held liable in damages after the 
court concluded that the Constitution invalidated the authority under which 
they purported to act.111 As one court explained, “[n]o question in law is 
better settled . . . than that ministerial officers and other persons are liable for 
acts done under an act of the legislature which is unconstitutional and 
void.”112 To be sure, some courts departed from this “settled” law, apparently 
on the doubtful basis that a justice of the peace enjoyed judicial immunity.113 
Yet, the dominant rule remained one of liability for unconstitutional action, 
action taken pursuant to invalid legislative authority. As the quoted 
explanation above makes clear, the liability attaches to both ministerial and 
 
 107 Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 739 (describing the Bank’s bill for a writ of injunction). 
 108 See id. at 836–37. 
 109 Id. at 867–68. 
 110 Id. at 839. 
 111 See Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1, 51 (1854) (allowing damages against an officer for 
seizing, keeping, and destroying liquor under an unconstitutional law); Shanley v. Wells, 71 Ill. 78, 83 
(1873) (allowing damages against an officer for an arrest pursuant to an unconstitutional vagrancy law); 
Campbell v. Sherman, 35 Wis. 103, 108 (1874) (allowing damages against an officer for seizing a 
steamboat pursuant to an unconstitutional law); Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341, 342 (1875) (allowing 
damages for false arrest, imprisonment, prosecution, and harm under an unconstitutional act); Gross v. 
Rice, 71 Me. 241, 257–58 (1880) (allowing a prisoner’s damages action against a warden who held him 
pursuant to an unconstitutional law); see also Woolsey v. Dodge, 30 F. Cas. 606, 609 (C.C.D. Ohio 1854) 
(No. 18,032) (declaring it unlawful to collect a tax that exceeds the government’s constitutional 
authority). 
 112 Sumner, 50 Ind. at 342. 
 113 See Henke v. McCord, 7 N.W. 623, 625–26 (Iowa 1880) (affording immunity to the justice of the 
peace and the officer who seized property under the authority of an unconstitutional ordinance); see 
Baude, supra note 7, at 2 (describing the boundaries of quasi-judicial immunity as “shaggy”). 
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“other” officers. Ohio state officials could not have evaded the controlling 
authority of federal constitutional law by invoking a body of state law that 
set up a zone of discretion for the taxation of the national Bank.114 
The nineteenth century’s emphasis on assured remediation—the notion 
expressed in Marbury that every right should have a remedy 115 —also 
influenced the common law’s approach to absolute official immunity. Keller 
cites Cooley’s treatise for the proposition that the governor enjoys absolute 
immunity in issuing pardons and reprieves, commanding the militia, and 
executing the law.116 All such actions would fall within the zone of executive 
discretion that Marbury described as off-limits to the courts.117 But suppose 
that a governor, in the course of commanding the militia and without any 
showing of necessity, directed his troops to occupy the farmstead of a state 
citizen or take the citizen’s crop to feed his soldiers? Or suppose that the 
officers of the U.S. Army caused the arrest of citizens on suspicion of giving 
aid and comfort to the British during the War of 1812? In both instances, 
whatever immunity the commander-in-chief enjoys, suit would lie against 
the officials who carried out those orders, triggering a challenge to the 
orders’ legality on the basis that they exceeded government power. 118 
Similarly, the absolute legislative immunity to which Keller refers119 meant 
that the assembly’s sergeant-at-arms was liable (as an executive officer) for 
carrying out the assembly’s orders to arrest and imprison individuals for 
 
 114  Keller sometimes questions this conclusion, suggesting that only ministerial officers faced 
liability for action taken on the basis of an invalid grant of authority. See Keller, supra note 6, at 1350–
52 (characterizing a naval captain, incongruously, as a ministerial officer). 
 115 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (describing as indisputable the rule 
that “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right 
is invaded”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1768)). 
 116  See Keller, supra note 6, at 1365 (quoting COOLEY, supra note 80, at 377). Even so, the 
governor’s ministerial duties “may be enforced by mandamus as in other cases.” MECHEM, supra note 
32, § 610. 
 117 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 167–70 (reaffirming the importance of remedies for violations 
of private rights but recognizing that executive branch officials enjoy a measure of unreviewable official 
discretion); see also MECHEM, supra note 32, § 594 (describing the “pardoning power of the executive” 
as an example of unreviewable discretion; the “governor may, in his discretion, grant a pardon, but no 
one can have a legal right to be pardoned . . . .The law does not attempt by its process to control 
discretionary power”). 
 118 See Pfander, supra note 25, at 754–55, 762–64 (describing successful legal challenges to military 
detention during the War of 1812 and to the taking of private property to support the troops during the 
Mexican–American War); see also Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1851) (holding 
that a colonel who expropriated a merchant’s property for military use during the Mexican–American 
War was liable for trespass and could not invoke his superior’s orders as a justification); Dow v. Johnson, 
100 U.S. 158, 169 (1879) (reaffirming Mitchell). 
 119 See Keller, supra note 6, at 1355–57. 
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contempt of Congress.120 In other words, absolute immunities (for presidents, 
governors, and legislators) did not always foreclose liability, but directed 
litigation towards the low-level officials charged with carrying their orders 
into effect. The warden who detains a prisoner on orders from the President, 
for example, must account to the court on habeas for the legality of such 
imprisonment. As to such low-level officers, no immunity (qualified or 
otherwise) was thought to apply. 
CONCLUSION 
Today, administrative law duplicates the nineteenth-century 
dispensation to a certain degree. Agencies enjoy discretion, conferred by 
Congress, within which they formulate rules and adjudicate disputes free 
from exacting judicial oversight.121 But reviewing courts continue to evaluate 
agency action for compliance with law, including the law of the Constitution. 
In Crowell v. Benson, the opinion that structures review of agency action, 
the Court sought to preserve federal judicial review of issues of law and some 
issues of constitutional and jurisdictional fact, apparently in an effort to 
preserve the boundary-enforcing role that common law courts had performed 
throughout the nineteenth century.122 Then as now, agency decisions may be 
invalidated if they exceed the limits of official discretion, lawfully conferred, 
under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.123 
But modern law handles positive government wrongs separately. Claims 
seeking redress for the torts of federal officers proceed under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (with zones of discretion but no qualified immunity),124 and 
constitutional tort claims against federal officers proceed under the Bivens 
doctrine.125 
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§§ 1346(b), 2671–2680. For the discretionary function exception, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
 125 For an overview of the Bivens doctrine, imposing personal liability on federal officials who 
commit constitutional torts, see generally James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, 
The Myth of Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561 (2020). 
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The debate over qualified immunity centers on the legitimacy of its 
recognition as a defense to claims under Section 1983 and Bivens for positive 
government wrongs, committed in violation of constitutional limits by law 
enforcement officers, both state and federal. In the early republic, as we have 
seen, constitutional law restricted the zone of lawful discretion, and 
government officials were held personally liable for the positive government 
wrongs they committed in exceeding the authority so limited. Departing 
from this common law backdrop, the modern Supreme Court, in its qualified 
immunity jurisprudence, has created a judge-made immunity that gives 
officials discretionary authority to violate the Constitution. Critics and 
defenders of the doctrine have had much to say. But, in contrast to the 
message Keller seeks to convey, one has difficulty locating a discretionary 
power to violate the Constitution in the decisional law of the nineteenth 
century. 
